

that Mr. Taft was the man above all others who could be depended upon to do this.

He Intended to Return.

There is no secret among his friends that when Mr. Roosevelt renounced a third consecutive term, which he could have had without any doubt, his eyes were set upon the future. He voluntarily left the Presidency, but he had every intention to return to it, and a belief that his return would be at no distant day. Hence it was his perfectly natural wish to have as successor one who in a broad sense would be loyal to himself, his policies, his fame and perhaps his future. It was only human nature that he should expect the man picked and placed by him, and that man one of his most intimate and affectionate friends, to be in some sort of fashion his representative; at the least his near and sincere friend after the choice as before it.

The former President's attitude of mind in this particular relation was clearly expressed by his reply to the question of a friend:

"Why did you select Taft to be your successor?"

"Because it had to be either Taft or Hughes. If I had kept hands off the campaign Hughes would have been nominated and elected. And if I had permitted Hughes to get into the White House I shouldn't have had a friend about the place. There's no telling what Hughes would have done. He might have changed the Panama Canal to a level ditch, so that it should not be known in history as the Roosevelt canal."

It is not to be inferred that Mr. Roosevelt feared this particular thing. This was merely his way of illustrating what had been in his mind—his desire to place in the White House a trustworthy, loyal, dependable friend rather than take chances with another who might be indifferent, uncertain, possibly hostile.

THE ROOSEVELT VERSION.

Colonel's Grievances as Described by Himself and His Friends.

The following is a composite statement of the Roosevelt account of the causes of the trouble, a part coming directly from the Colonel himself, a part from one or other of his friends familiar with the facts:

"Col. Roosevelt became aware, immediately after election, that some sort of change had taken place in Mr. Taft's mind and attitude. From election day on to inauguration all the trouble arose. At first, of course, the change in Mr. Taft, as discerned by the then President, was very slight, almost insensible. It would perhaps be better to say that it was a case of 'swelled head,' but it bordered on that. There was very early what seemed a determination on the part of the new President to map out a course for himself regardless of the policies or wishes of the President who was retiring.

"The first tangible cause of offence were relatively trivial things, pin pricks. The President-elect appeared in Washington long before the inauguration and set up at the Boardman residence what was known as 'the little White House.' He held a sort of court there, receiving members of the Senate and House, and for a time this new political centre somewhat overshadowed the actual White House in public attention. Mr. Roosevelt did not regard this as a matter of great importance; it was not a cause of quarrel; but in his opinion, frankly expressed at the time, it was a few of his intimates, it was on Mr. Taft's part an unnecessary, tactless, inconsiderate procedure.

Social Gossip Plays a Part.

"About this time there came another pin prick, peculiarly annoying. Mrs. Roosevelt's management of the social and domestic affairs of the White House had generally been regarded as a model. There had been no criticism of it, only praise. Hence the surprise was great when gossip carried to the Roosevelt family the rumor that an important member of the Taft family had said: 'After March 4 you will see a great change at the White House; the social regime is to be completely reorganized and put on a basis of dignity and good taste.' Inquiry developed the fact that this statement, with some elaboration of details of the proposed reformation, had actually been made. The boy with which it was received in the White House may be imagined.

"When this was discussed in the Roosevelt family, as of course it was, it presented an opportunity for recollection of a prediction uttered nearly a year before by one member of the family who had habitually kept well in the background but who had nevertheless watched always with keen eyes and great intelligence the characters passed in review in the political activities of the Administration. The prediction had been that if President Roosevelt picked Mr. Taft for his successor that gentleman would get the sound measure of a tariff to discomfit the Colonel himself and true friendship which the Colonel himself expected and that in the event of Mr. Taft's nomination and election trouble would come in a way which Mr. Roosevelt did not then dream of. This prediction was recalled with an interrogation as to whether or not it was not already becoming true.

"In this period there were not as many conferences between President Roosevelt and President-elect Taft as people naturally supposed there would be. And the few conferences that did take place concerning the policies of the incoming Administration were not as frank and full as would seem natural and right under all the circumstances. The lack of frankness, the disinclination to engage in full discussion of new plans and purposes, was chiefly on the side of Mr. Taft. Mr. Roosevelt very early discovered that Mr. Taft's mental attitude appeared to be that of a man who was determined to 'go it alone,' to work out his destiny without advice or counsel from his predecessor.

Disinclination to Dictate.

"Mr. Roosevelt had no desire to dictate. He made no effort to dictate policies or appointments. In fact he distinctly stated to Mr. Taft: 'You are the responsible man; you will have to work it out in your own way.' But it seemed to Mr. Roosevelt that Mr. Taft accepted this with too great alacrity and liberality. He did not even care much for the counsel or advice of the man who had picked him up and made him President. Although Mr. Taft had more than once pledged himself, in the most solemn manner, to continue the Roosevelt policies, now that he was about to enter upon the administration he seemed strangely loath to discuss those policies with their author. Mr. Roosevelt thus early gained the impression that some sort of a change had come over Mr. Taft, that the President had fallen to some extent under other influences, and he naturally had his opinions as to what those influences were.

"It was inevitable, with these con-

ditions, with what appeared to Mr. Roosevelt to be a new and unexpected sort of Taft to deal with, that pride should compel him to an unwelcome degree of reserve. He would not and could not offer suggestions and advice which appeared to be unwelcome. The result was that Mr. Roosevelt's conferences with Mr. Taft were of little importance. They did not get down to the heart of things at all. Mr. Taft was bubbling with happiness and good spirits; he showed affection toward his former chief; outwardly no change in their relations was visible. But as a matter of fact the change was very great. Mr. Roosevelt, puzzled, more hurt, more disappointed, more reserved, and more reserved, he more and more felt that he was 'out of it'; that the new broom was to sweep clean, in its own way, without any help from him. He was too proud to show his hurt and disappointment; and he met Mr. Taft's good comradeship with the best imitation he could make of the same on his part. So well did Mr. Roosevelt play his part, so well did he disguise his actual feelings, that Mr. Taft, full of his own plans, ideas and importance, never suspected what was in the mind of his friend. This continued to the day of inauguration.

Break Over Cabinet Appointments.

"It was in this same new broom on one side not comprehended change of spirit and feeling that Cabinet appointments were discussed between the two men. There was not nearly as much discussion of this sort as people have supposed. In fact, there was very little. It has been said and generally believed among Col. Roosevelt's friends that the real cause of the break between the two men was this: That Mr. Taft had promised Mr. Roosevelt to keep Garfield, Meyer and Straus in his Cabinet; and to put Mr. Loeb into the Cabinet; that he broke these promises except as to the case of Meyer, and kept that part only because Senator Lodge, having Meyer would return to Massachusetts and supplant his son-in-law, Gardner, as Representative from the Gloucester district, camped on Taft's trail till he got Meyer kept; that Mr. Taft afterward apologized to Mr. Garfield for not keeping him, intimating that he had incurred obligations in the campaign which made it impossible for him to do otherwise, and these obligations were construed by Mr. Taft's critics as meaning a debt to the Garfield interest which had to be repaid by the appointment of Mr. Ballinger.

"But this story, which has had wide circulation in gossip, does an injustice to Mr. Taft and is not the truth. Mr. Roosevelt, of course, never asked for the retention in the Cabinet of any of his friends. He carefully avoided making any such request or anything that could be construed into a request. The most he did was to suggest the value of the services, as he looked upon it, of such men as Garfield, Meyer and Straus, and in the case of Garfield particularly he laid stress upon the fact that the young man had not only done great work but had made great sacrifices and that it would be only a matter of personal justice to keep him. As to the others Mr. Roosevelt did not care so much; they were able to take care of themselves. He did not ask that Loeb be promoted to the Cabinet, only suggesting that Loeb should be given good care of, and in fact Mr. Loeb himself wanted to get away from Washington.

Thought Taft Would Keep Garfield.

"Now, Mr. Roosevelt did not think it necessary for him to make a distinct request for the retention of any of his friends. He did not think, under the circumstances, considering the great debt Mr. Taft owed him and the fact that Mr. Taft was his grateful friend and a true gentleman, that it was necessary only to indicate a wish and it would be respected. It seemed to him that Mr. Taft would make it his business to ascertain what things he himself desired and not ask that particular care about them. Do them without a word of question. Notwithstanding the change he thought he saw in the mental attitude of his successor, for a long time Mr. Roosevelt had not the slightest doubt Mr. Garfield was to be retained.

"It is important as well as interesting to state the exact facts about this Cabinet business. When Mr. Roosevelt visited his particular friends in the Cabinet, always with stress upon Jimmie Garfield, Mr. Taft listened good humoredly, apparently with full assent. He did not say it was his intention to keep those men, or any of them; nor did he say to the contrary. But the impression left upon the mind of Mr. Roosevelt, at least for a considerable time, was that Mr. Taft would respond to his wishes, particularly as to Garfield.

"Others knew that Garfield was not to be kept and that Ballinger was to take his place while Mr. Roosevelt was still innocently assuming to the contrary. Mr. Taft told more than one friend that he did not consider Garfield and Straus 'of Cabinet size' and therefore would not keep them. But he did not say this to Mr. Roosevelt. He did say to one of Mr. Roosevelt's confidants, apparently supposing that this gentleman would pass the information on to the President; but that gentleman did not regard it as his right or duty to do so. It seemed to him that, inasmuch as Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Taft were the closest of friends, one the sponsor and the other the protégé, with gratitude, loyalty, affection and frankness availing between them, it would be an impertinence for an outsider to attempt to convey to either of them information which of course he must already have had at first hand.

Roosevelt in the Dark.

"The result was that it was a long time before Mr. Roosevelt learned that he did not have enough influence with the incoming Administration to secure the retention of his friend Garfield, and when he did learn the fact he also learned that others had had the information long before it came to him. It is unnecessary to attempt to describe the effect of this upon Mr. Roosevelt.

"These were matters affecting the personal relations of the two men. But it was not long before evidence came to Mr. Roosevelt that his protégé was not coming up to expectations as to his pledges to continue the Roosevelt policies. It will be remembered that during the closing days of the Roosevelt administration there was a progressive uprising in Congress, 'insurgents' they were called then, a protest against the Joe Cannon regime in the House primarily, but in effect an effort to get away from the old oligarchical system of congressional government. At the same time President Roosevelt was engaged in a bitter struggle against the Cannon forces over the secret service appropriations and the charges made by Speaker Cannon's lieutenant, Representative Tan-

ney, that the President had used secret service officers to spy upon Senators and Representatives for White House political purposes.

"This was one of the most bitter of all Mr. Roosevelt's contests with the people of Congress, and it was a war in which he was most anxious to come out victorious. Involved in it to a certain extent was the question whether or not Speaker Cannon should be chosen for another term and the whole question of tariff versus liberalism in Congress.

"While this struggle was raging President-elect Taft arrived in Washington, set up his 'little White House' and entered upon a series of negotiations with Speaker Cannon and the lobby forces of Capitol Hill. President Roosevelt was but poorly if at all informed as to the nature and progress of these negotiations and presently was astounded to learn that President-elect Taft had made a treaty of peace with the Speaker and the forces represented by the Speaker, which included the Cannon-Aldrich regime, known to the country as standpat, reactionary or anti-progressive.

"With this fact before him President Roosevelt reached a definite conclusion that the man he had placed in the Presidential chair had forgotten his ante-election pledges and gone over to the enemy. In fact, his enemies made their boasts that while they had not been strong enough to stand against the influence of Roosevelt and nominate one of their own number for President, they had done the next best thing, which was to capture the man the President did nominate and elect.

It Was the Last Straw.

"President-elect Taft's treaty of peace with the Cannon forces was the last straw needed to break down the friendship between the outgoing and the incoming President. From that moment Mr. Roosevelt had no real confidence in Mr. Taft and felt that he had been betrayed by his protégé both on personal and political grounds. Again Mr. Roosevelt was too proud to show his hurt; ostensibly the old friendship was unbroken, and among those who never suspected the truth was Mr. Taft.

"Col. Roosevelt left Washington thoroughly disgusted and was glad to put it all behind him and sail for Africa for a year's outing. The day he sailed occurred on the full moon, the anniversary of the death of American politician. A messenger from the White House brought him a little gift from the President, accompanied by a farewell letter wishing him for his favor and concluding with these words, quoted verbatim:

"Next to my brother Charles, I think I owe more to you than to any other living man."

"Col. Roosevelt's anger over this 'next to my brother Charles' was very great. He took it as a personal affront. To be rated second to a man who had merely put up a sum of money, he who had used the power of his office and his party leadership and his personal prestige and skill to make one of his lieutenants his successor, and then to play second fiddle, in the estimation of that successor, to one who had signed a few checks, it was with this last cruel thrust of ingratitude—next to my brother Charles—ringing in his ears that Col. Roosevelt sailed away to Africa, thoroughly convinced that from both the personal and the public viewpoints his selection of Mr. Taft to be his heir was the greatest blunder of his public career.

"During his sojourn in Africa Mr. Roosevelt received a great number of letters from his friends at home telling him that the new President had forgotten his pledges to stand by the Roosevelt policies and had, in the belief of the writers, gone completely over to the opposition. After his return to America Col. Roosevelt became convinced that this was in a large measure true. Asked one day for his opinion of the Taft Administration, Col. Roosevelt replied: 'Mr. Taft has been a failure as President. He has had a chance, wobbled, and lost it.'"

THE TAFT VERSION.

All the Ill Feeling on Roosevelt's Part—The President Unconscious of Giving Cause for Offence.

The Taft side of the story given here is also a composite narrative composed of statements made by the President himself or by his close friends:

"It was not till after Col. Roosevelt's return from Africa in 1910 that President Taft had even a suspicion that the Colonel's feelings toward himself had undergone a change. The President felt for Mr. Roosevelt all his former affection and gratitude, and when the first reports came to him of the feeling on the part of the Colonel Mr. Taft would not credit them. It seemed to him impossible. This of course means two things: The President was not aware of having given cause of offence; and he was equally oblivious to the fact that offence had been taken through misunderstanding or misconception.

"The first published statement forecasting the break came in a cablegram from one of the special correspondents accompanying Mr. Roosevelt on his return from Africa. It was sent when the Colonel's party reached Naples and contained the statement that Col. Roosevelt no longer looked with favor upon Mr. Taft and was returning to America with a firm determination not to support the President for a second term. Mr. Taft, who was absolutely without foundation, and that what had been written by some person whose design was to create trouble where no trouble existed.

"After Col. Roosevelt had reached America the President learned upon direct information that it was true—the old friendship was broken, so far as the Roosevelt end of it was concerned. To say that Mr. Taft was surprised and pained is to put the matter mildly. It was to him a great, a sincere grief. He at once began searching his memory to see if he could find wherein he had been at fault. He was not able to recall any cause of offence which in his opinion warranted a moment's consideration.

Taft Seeks Information.

"Moreover, the President asked mutual friends to go to the Colonel and endeavor to learn directly and precisely the cause of the trouble, and that he was offering amends if amends on his part seemed called for by the facts.

"These mutual friends were not able to report definite and satisfactory progress. Col. Roosevelt was loath to enter upon a full and frank explanation or upon anything which savored of an attempt at negotiating a reconciliation. As nearly as these representatives of the President could make out from their conversations with the Colonel his grievances were three in number, as follows:

"First—The petty affairs, such as alleged remarks about a social reforma-

tion at the White House; some feminine misunderstandings and antipathies; the fact that the President-elect had for a brief season occupied the Boardman house at Washington and there consulted public men while arranging the general outlines of his administrative policy. All these were most anxious to come out victorious. Involved in it to a certain extent was the question whether or not Speaker Cannon should be chosen for another term and the whole question of tariff versus liberalism in Congress.

"While this struggle was raging President-elect Taft arrived in Washington, set up his 'little White House' and entered upon a series of negotiations with Speaker Cannon and the lobby forces of Capitol Hill. President Roosevelt was but poorly if at all informed as to the nature and progress of these negotiations and presently was astounded to learn that President-elect Taft had made a treaty of peace with the Speaker and the forces represented by the Speaker, which included the Cannon-Aldrich regime, known to the country as standpat, reactionary or anti-progressive.

"With this fact before him President Roosevelt reached a definite conclusion that the man he had placed in the Presidential chair had forgotten his ante-election pledges and gone over to the enemy. In fact, his enemies made their boasts that while they had not been strong enough to stand against the influence of Roosevelt and nominate one of their own number for President, they had done the next best thing, which was to capture the man the President did nominate and elect.

Full Letter Never Published.

"Third—The 'next to my brother Charles' letter sent by President Taft to Col. Roosevelt at the steamer on which he was sailing for Africa. This letter has never been published; the context of it has not been fully or correctly stated. The full letter would soften the expression which Col. Roosevelt so bitterly resented. If Mr. Taft had it to do over again it is probable he would employ a more tactful phrase. But the whole purpose of the mislive was as an expression of gratitude and friendship. If the one phrase was a slip, read alone, it should be interpreted in the light of the fact that William H. Taft has always felt the keenest sense of gratitude to his half brother Charles. In writing this letter and that objectionable phrase, he did not have in mind merely the events of the previous year, the Presidential campaign, as apparently Col. Roosevelt had, but his entire career in public life, a large part of which had been made possible by his brother Charles.

"When the mutual friends made this report to Mr. Taft the President felt there had been a great deal of truth and just cause for his grateful as before. He consented to Senator Lodge's plan to bring about a meeting between the two principals at the Senator's home in Nahant with a view to a frank talk over differences and if possible a reestablishment of the old relations. At the meeting the President went more than half way toward peace; but he was not met in a like spirit of conciliation by Col. Roosevelt. The Colonel was suspiciously polite, outwardly friendly, but gave unmistakable indication that he did not care for a private or intimate talk. Hence nothing happened; the reconciliation programme was a failure.

"In conversation with his intimate friends President Taft has reviewed the incidents which happened between election and inauguration, and he has been unable to find any justification for the claim that his attitude toward Col. Roosevelt was other than irreproachable.

"At the conferences President Roosevelt said again and again to Mr. Taft: 'You will have to work out your own salvation. You start in with a clean slate. You inherit my general policies, but not my quarrels. I am going away to Africa for a year so that every one can see I am not trying to interfere with you in any way.'"

Sought Harmony to Get Results.

"One of the great questions that confronted the new Administration was how to get results from Congress. The Republican party in the national legislature was split into two factions. Mr. Taft stood pledged before the country to a programme of tariff revision, and he wanted to put the house in order to secure results. So he took a leaf out of the book of his illustrious predecessor and sought to make terms with the opposition, if opposition it could be called, to bring the factions together for the sake of action.

"As to Cabinet appointments, here again there was no misunderstanding; or no misunderstanding due to lack of sincerity and openness on Mr. Taft's part. It doubtless is true that in the early days after the election, when Mr. Taft was saying good-bye to his friends, he said that Mr. Taft was disinclined to hurt the Colonel's feelings by a too blunt or hasty judgment against the Colonel's protégé. Doubtless the matter of Garfield's retention was permitted to drift along for a time. But in the end, when he believed the proper moment had come, Mr. Taft plainly indicated, as delicately as he could, as that he did not regard Mr. Garfield as of Cabinet size. So far as Mr. Taft knew Col. Roosevelt understood this and raised no protest.

Taft Did the Best He Could.

"As to the charge that President Taft failed to carry out the Roosevelt policies and 'went over to the enemy' Mr. Taft never had such a thought in mind. He was President; he was the responsible man; he was seeking results; he had not inherited Col. Roosevelt's quarrels. He was doing the best he could in a difficult situation. The only person who suspected that the new President was not in good faith carrying out the Roosevelt policies were a few of the former President's personal intimates, members of the tennis cabinet, who were disappointed because their influence at the White House was naturally much less than under the former. They raised the cry that President Taft had gone back on the Roosevelt policies. They wrote letters to the Colonel in Africa, and filled his ears with their complaints as soon as they could get at him.

"Finally President Taft's friendship for and gratitude to Col. Roosevelt, before the relations between them had been disturbed by the Colonel's umbrage and the trouble making of his friends, may be best summed up in a statement Mr. Taft made on more than one occasion to his intimates:

"If Col. Roosevelt said the President, that he returned from Africa my friend, as I believed he was, and felt that I was his friend, and he felt permitted to me to know that he wished to be nominated for the Presidency again in 1912 nothing would have given me greater pleasure than to retire in his favor and to use all my influence in bringing about his nomination and election. Under such circumstances I should have felt it a privilege thus to repay the great debt of gratitude I owed him."

CAUSES LEADING UP TO THE REPUBLICAN BREAK

The Trouble Began on Roosevelt's Accession to the Presidency.

NO REVISION OF TARIFF

He Announced He Would Carry Out McKinley's Policy, but Failed to Do So.

The Presidential contest of 1912, which within a few hours will be ended, marks, in the estimation of the more thoughtful members of the Republican party, the culmination of years of factional discord and personal bitterness which have had few parallels in the annals of the political history of the country. In the event of an overwhelming defeat for the Republicans the disaster can be directly traced to these long continued family quarrels and to the prolonged dissensions over party policies which have involved personal rivalries of the most heated character.

Concerning party policies it may not be an exaggeration to state that the principal differences have been aroused over the tariff and the failure to heed the warning words of President McKinley at Buffalo the day before he was assassinated. In a speech which was made doubly famous from the fact that Mr. McKinley had been known as the High Priest of Protection, the renowned Ohio statesman emphatically declared that occasion that it was time to call a halt and that he had been invariably contended that President McKinley's speech pointed the way to a revision of the tariff by which the general consumer would be more directly benefited than he had been under previous tariff bills, the McKinley bill, the Wilson bill and the Dingley bill.

The untimely death of McKinley elevated Vice-President Roosevelt to the Presidency's chair. With Roosevelt's accession he publicly announced that he would immediately call an extraordinary session of Congress in order to carry out the dying words of McKinley. Constantly and with emphatic reiteration did President Roosevelt utter these statements. Suddenly, without warning and without explanation, Roosevelt changed his policy and no extraordinary session was called to revise the tariff. It has been known in the inner circles of the Republican national party that Representative Joseph G. Cannon, then Speaker of the House of Representatives, was largely if not principally responsible for President Roosevelt's change of heart on this question.

The little band of Progressives in the House of Representatives and the United States Senate became immediately restless and their activities slowly but surely became the effective means for entering the first wedge of disunion and party disintegration. This was not apparent, though, in the Presidential campaign of 1904, when Roosevelt was triumphantly elected. It has always been insisted, though, that Roosevelt's tremendous popular and electoral vote that year was due in a measure to the weakness of Alton B. Parker, the Democratic candidate for the Presidency, and the open disloyalty of the followers of William J. Bryan.

However that may be, with Roosevelt elected the words of McKinley at Buffalo were still left unheeded. The Progressives in the House, headed by Representative Victor Murdock, and in the United States Senate, by Senator La Follette, continued on their way. They never tired and they never permitted obstacles to prevent their onward advance. Eventually the power of Speaker Cannon was curtailed.

Meanwhile the letter of the late Edward H. Harriman to the late Sidney Webster threw many Republicans almost into convulsions over the developments concerning the campaign funds of 1904. Mr. Taft, Secretary of War in President Roosevelt's Cabinet, was sent to Ohio to attack Senator Joseph Benson Foraker. Mr. Taft's speech at Akron resulted in the overthrow of the Republican organization in Hamilton county and in the defeat of Gov. Myron T. Herrick for reelection.

In almost every State the Roosevelt administration precipitated war on old time Republican leaders. His objective seemed to be against every Republican leader in the country who in any way had been associated with Marcus Alonzo Hanna and Hanna's friends. He had questioned the Hanna election of 1904, before the Presidential election of 1904, believing that Hanna was a candidate for the nomination that year. From that hour he resolutely and unflinchingly and persistently fought the old Republican leaders who had been powerful factors in the Harrison and McKinley days.

In 1908 Roosevelt decreed the nomination of Taft. The party at that time was torn by factional feuds and personal rivalries, of a character that had not been observed since the days of Garfield and Conkling. But Taft was easily elected for the sole and simple reason that many Democrats would not accept William J. Bryan, who had been nominated for the third time. The most expert political students and publicists have declared that had Bryan in 1901 accepted those words "I do not believe in the tariff," in the late summer of 1908 he would, by calling for tariff revision, with little improbability have won very close to defeating Taft. Roosevelt's electoral vote in 1904 was 336, and Parker's 140; while Taft's in 1908 was 321 and Bryan's 162. Yet Roosevelt's popular plurality in 1904 was 2,544,343, and Taft's in 1908, 1,269,806.

President Taft immediately after his inauguration called an extraordinary session of Congress, which passed the Payne-Aldrich tariff bill. Without discussing the merits of that bill it is only necessary to say that the Progressives have attributed the Republican overthrow of 1910, by which Democratic Governors were elected in New York, Indiana, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maine, and Ohio, and the House of Representatives became Democratic, to the features of the Payne-Aldrich tariff. The regular Republicans, replying to that charge, however, have recalled that so long as Roosevelt refused to interfere with the Dingley tariff law the Republicans remained in power in the nation and in the States mentioned, with the exception of Ohio, which had elected Harmon Governor in 1908.

The troubles of President Taft's Administration have been many. They have

been recounted so frequently and so recently that it is not necessary to reiterate them now. The break between himself and Roosevelt and the causes were exhaustively recorded in THE SUN on March 17 last. Ex-President Roosevelt's battle for supremacy in New York State in 1910 and its result are also too well known to call for extended comment. His demand that he be nominated for President at Chicago in June last and his defeat, and his leadership of the Progressive National party, with himself as its candidate for President, have been perhaps the crowning disaster to the Republican national party. The strictures of the Taft Administration on the railroads of the country, accompanied by the fact that these repressions have led almost to an entire stoppage of railroad development, and the drastic legislation against business enterprises in nearly all the States have contributed to countless and volcanic criticisms of the Republican party by its most influential members and by the men who have been instrumental for many years in sustaining its political fortunes.

All these features and many more, in the judgment of those who are competent to speak and who have spoken with emphasis within the last few days, spell nothing but disaster for the Republican party in the nation and in a vast majority of the States on Tuesday. These utterances have been accompanied by salient remarks to the effect that the democratic national party is not competent to win a victory by itself for the reason that there are not Democrats enough in the country to elect a President.

But Gov. Wilson is to be elected by these Republicans who declare that they have been outraged by the conduct of many of the principal men of their own party. They recall that there has been no such state of affairs since the campaign of 1892, when the feuds precipitated in his party by President Harrison and provoked to a large extent by the chief members of his party led to the overwhelming defeat of the Republicans and the reelection of Cleveland by Republican votes. All this was changed with the advent of President McKinley in 1896. McKinley, in his gentle and tactful way, brought all the great chieftains of his party together in amicable and harmonious relations.

Even then, though, Theodore Roosevelt, inasmuch as a factor for discord, was a factor for discord. As Assistant Secretary of the Navy he questioned with Secretary Long and provoked even the criticism of so gentle a soul as McKinley. In 1898, when Roosevelt became Governor of New York State, there was many a breeze at Albany and many a change in the policies of the Republican State organization. In 1900, at Philadelphia, there was ruction over the proposition to nominate Roosevelt for Vice-President. And so it has gone on from the very first day that Roosevelt entered public life as an Assemblyman for the old Twenty-first district in New York city. He has been an ardent and a fighter, and yet the Republican party has gone on promoting him until he attained the most powerful place in all the world, President of the United States.

Whatever be the cause of the Progressive party in the nation and in the different States on Tuesday, it is the opinion of President Roosevelt that within the next four years that party will absorb or annex the Republican party and that the party of Lincoln and the old time Republican chieftains of fifty and more years ago will forever sink into oblivion and follow over the political seas the famous Whig party of ante-bellum days.

OUTLOOK IN VIRGINIA.

Wilson Will Get a Big Majority, Roosevelt a Possible Second.

RICHMOND, Va., Nov. 2.—Virginia is seeing the close of the most lethargic political campaign ever witnessed in this State. During the last twenty years, in view of the certainty of a Democratic majority, there has been very little excitement in any campaign and the fight of 1912 will go down in history as the deadest one only. Only two Congress districts, the Fifth and Ninth, have there been any sort of a fight.

With voting but two days off there is apparently no change in the situation. That the State will give Woodrow Wilson a large majority goes without question, but there are many, in view of the lack of interest in the campaign, who believe that Wilson will not poll the vote that William Jennings Bryan did in 1908, when he got a total of 82,946. In that year Taft polled 52,753 votes, and in view of the split in the Republican party and the interest created between the two factions it is believed that nearly the full Republican strength will be voted, with probably Theodore Roosevelt having a majority of the Republican votes over William Taft. It is believed that the vote will be about as follows:

Wilson, 78,065; Taft, 24,000; Roosevelt, 22,876; Chafin, 1,200; Debs, 275.

The agreement between Representative Bascomb Slomp, Republican, and Rufus A. Ayres, Democrat, not to spend money in buying votes in the Ninth district, with the Progressives having a candidate in the field in the person of Walter Graham, makes the result in the Ninth an uncertainty. Heretofore it has been looked upon as a Republican stronghold, but the division between the Republicans and Progressives may result in Gen. Ayres winning the fight.

The results for Congressmen will be as follows:

First District—W. A. Jones, Democrat, will be reelected, having no opposition. Second District—E. H. Holland, Democrat, will be reelected, defeating N. T. Green, Progressive. Third District—Andrew J. Montague, Democrat, will be reelected, defeating C. A. Haight, Socialist candidate. Fourth District—Walter A. Watson, Democrat, will be elected, defeating Fred H. Hays, Socialist candidate. Fifth District—W. E. Saunders, Democrat, will be reelected, defeating A. B. Hamner, Republican. Sixth District—Carter Glass, Democrat, will be reelected, defeating J. S. Brown, Progressive. Seventh District—James H. Hays, Democrat, will be reelected, defeating George N. Earman, Republican, and E. C. Garrison, Socialist.

Eighth District—C. C. Carlin, Democrat, will be reelected without opposition. Ninth District—C. Bascomb Slomp, Republican, will probably be reelected over Gen. Rufus A. Ayres, Democrat, and Walter Graham, Progressive.

Tenth District—Hal D. Flood, Democrat, will be reelected, defeating E. J. McCulloch, Progressive, and Nathan Parkins, Socialist. Three amendments to the Constitution are to be voted on in the November election. One of these has not the slightest prospect of success. It changes the Constitution so as to permit the General Assembly to pass laws providing for cities other forms of government than those now in vogue, permitting cities to change their form of government at will. The other amendments are intended to permit city treasurers to succeed themselves, and to limit the term of office of city commissioners to one year, and to provide that city commissioners of the revenue shall be elected by the people and be eligible to succeed themselves.

The people in many ways are defeated.

GOV. WILSON IS STILL THE FAVORITE IN OHIO

The Taft Tide Has Set In, but Is Not Likely to Overwhelm Wilson's Lead.

T. R. A POSSIBLE SECOND

In the Twenty-one Congress Districts the Democrats May Win in Seventeen.

COLUMBUS, Nov. 2.—Although the Republican leaders have laid great emphasis on the prosperity issue during the closing days of the campaign, it is not thought here that sufficient headway has been made to offset the recognized lead which Wilson has had during the summer and fall in Ohio. There is now little expectation that the State will go Republican. Wilson is the favorite by a substantial plurality, with Roosevelt a possible second.

In considering the Bull Moose chances, one notes that the agitation for the Colonel is somewhat spotted, but his campaigners have spread the gospel of the "holly cause" with telling effect. In some localities, Roosevelt's friends have little or no following, but in most sections of the State their organizations seem to be possessed of a spontaneous and fervid enthusiasm which is contagious.

In the face of the Taft prosperity argument and the reform proposals of the Progressives, Democratic campaigners have held their line well intact. There is reason to believe the Democrats will lose any large blocks of votes, as they did in the Bryan and Parker campaigns. Bull Moose appeals have fallen on deaf ears among Democrats. Their conversions have been almost entirely from the Republican camp.

With their State organization completely demoralized at the start, the Republicans have done mighty well in the work of rebuilding. Not only was the State committee purged of every Bull Moose sympathizer, but county committees as well were remade. Had it been possible to effect these changes earlier, it is likely the Republican campaign would have been immensely more effective. There can be no doubt that the last three weeks have witnessed daily events tending to bear out the claim of Chairman Daugherty that the Taft tide had set in and was increasing in volume.

To overcome the feeling against Taft in his home State, however, unprecedented misadventure work was necessary and this was impossible in the few weeks available. If at